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ABSTRACT
IZA DP No. 13184 APRIL 2020
Does Early Access to Pension Wealth 
Improve Health?*
We examine the health impacts of early access to public pension wealth by exploiting a 
unique policy in Singapore allowing individuals to withdraw a proportion of their pension 
savings after their 55th birthday. For the identification, we employ a regression discontinuity 
design by comparing individuals before and after their 55th birthday. To address anticipated 
and lagged health impacts, we adopt the donut regression discontinuity approach. Using 
nationally representative monthly panel data, we find that early access to pension wealth 
improves self-reported overall health.
JEL Classification: I10, H55, D15











* We are grateful to Junxing Chay for his excellent research assistance. We thank the seminar participants at 
Fudan University and Peking University for their valuable comments. We also thank the editor, Jason Lindo, and 
two anonymous reviewers. The SLP data collection was financially supported by Singapore Ministry of Education 
Academic Research Fund Tier 3 grant (MOE2013-T3-1-009). Koh gratefully acknowledges financial support by Korea 
University grant (K2009571). All errors are our own.
Published in Economic Inquiry, 2020, 58 (4), 1783-1794. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12903
 1 
1. Introduction 
Much research has been conducted to understand how and why economic resources affect 
welfare. The majority of the empirical studies in the literature have focused on changes in the 
levels of economic resources (e.g., cash transfers, inheritances, lottery wins, layoffs) and their 
welfare implications. However, can changes in the allocations of economic resources within the 
life-cycle of an individual also affect welfare? In the absence of complete capital markets, 
individuals are constrained from optimally responding to income shocks (e.g., borrowing money 
in a state with a higher marginal utility of consumption) because of liquidity constraints, leading 
to lower welfare. 
An important policy application of this question is whether individuals should be allowed 
early access to pension wealth before retirement. To ensure adequate retirement preparedness, 
many governments mandate their citizens to save a significant proportion of labor income and 
make pension savings inaccessible before reaching an official claiming age. Under the standard 
life-cycle model of a rational agent, such a policy is inefficient because it creates additional 
liquidity constraints. Therefore, some countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
South Korea, and Singapore have recently implemented policies that relax the withdrawal 
restrictions of pension balances before the official claiming age (Beshears et al. 2015). 
Despite growing policy debate, credible empirical evidence about the effects of early 
access to pension wealth is rare. Previous studies focus on the effects of flexible access to 
defined contribution retirement savings accounts (Amromin and Smith 2003; Argento et al. 
2015; Armour et al. 2015). These studies have two empirical issues. First, those who enroll in 
employer-based defined contribution retirement savings plans are self-selected. Second, these 
studies cannot use an exogenous variation in the eligibility of early access to pension wealth. As 
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a result, they only provide descriptive evidence. To overcome these limitations, Agarwal et al. 
(2018) studied an age-based pension policy rule in Singapore that runs a defined contribution-
style public pension savings system called the Central Provident Fund (CPF). The CPF is a 
comprehensive social security savings system under which local residents are required to 
contribute a certain proportion of their earnings. Singaporeans are allowed to withdraw a 
proportion of their CPF balances once reaching their 55th birthday. Agarwal et al. (2018) showed 
that this early withdrawal policy modestly increases consumption spending and reduces credit 
card debt. 
In this study, we examine the health impacts of early access to pension wealth. A direct 
mechanism through which such early access can improve health is the increase in healthcare 
utilization (Grossman 1972). In principle, individuals can receive more medical treatment when 
they are allowed to withdraw pension wealth. However, this is not likely to be the case in our 
setting because Singaporeans can withdraw balances in the medical savings account in the CPF 
system when they or their immediate family members incur medical expenditure regardless of 
age. Therefore, flexible access to pension wealth might have little impact on health via the 
healthcare spending channel. 
Another mechanism, which has not received much attention in the literature, is “peace of 
mind.” Early access to pension wealth allows individuals to reallocate wealth over time, but they 
do not experience an increase in wealth or income over the remaining life-cycle. In this 
institutional setting, individuals might experience less stress (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006) 
even without changing consumption spending or labor supply.1 Since improvements in 
 
1 Agarwal et al. (2018) found that only a small proportion of withdrawn money is spent—even among those who have 
withdrawn. A growing literature investigates peace of mind as a possible channel through which health insurance 
improves individuals’ subjective well-being. Haushofer et al. (2018) recently showed that access to health insurance 
significantly improves quality of life measured by cortisol level (known as a stress hormone)—even among those who 
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psychological well-being or happiness could improve health (Graham 2008; Steptoe et al. 2015), 
we argue that psychological well-being could be a mechanism through which the early pension 
withdrawal policy could affect health. 
 To identify the causal effects of early access to pension wealth on health, we exploit the 
same policy rule that Agarwal et al. (2018) used. We adopt an age-based regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) by comparing individuals around the age cutoff of withdrawal eligibility. To 
address the presence of anticipation and lagged health impacts, we also employ the donut RD 
approach following Barreca et al. (2011, 2016). Using data from the Singapore Life Panel (SLP), 
a nationally representative monthly longitudinal survey of Singaporeans aged 50–70 years, we 
find evidence that early access to pension wealth discontinuously improves self-reported health 
status. However, we do not find discontinuous changes in individuals’ medical spending at the 
same cutoff age. Instead, we find discontinuous improvements in individuals’ psychological 
well-being measured by life satisfaction in economic situations. Further, we find no 
discontinuous changes in labor supply and consumption spending related to health at the cutoff 
age. Given this evidence, we argue that early access to pension wealth might have improved 
health via the improvement in psychological well-being.  
 We contribute to the literature by providing novel evidence on how early access to 
pension wealth affects an individual’s health. Numerous studies have examined the health 
impacts of economic resources by exploiting an exogenous change in income or wealth through 
lottery winning (Lindahl 2005; Apouey and Clark 2015; Cesarini et al. 2016), inheritance (Van 
Kippersluis and Galama 2014), and public cash transfer (Gross and Tobacman 2014). By 
 
do not use healthcare. Kim and Koh (2018) also showed that expanded healthcare insurance coverage improves overall 
life satisfaction via the peace-of-mind channel. 
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contrast, our study exploits an exogenous change in the intertemporal allocations of economic 
resources via the early pension balance withdrawal policy. 
This study is also related to the literature on the effects of pension rules in the United 
States and Europe on health (Snyder and Evans 2006; Behncke 2012; Hallberg et al. 2015; 
Bloemaen et al. 2017; Fitzpatrick and Moore 2018; Gelber et al. 2018; Gorry et al. 2018; Kuhn et 
al. 2018; Picchio and Van Ours 2018). This literature has mainly examined the effects of pension 
rules at later ages close to retirement, such as changes in the benefit amounts and the official 
pension claiming age. We complement this literature by investigating the health impacts of an 
individual’s ability to withdraw some of his or her pension balances at a younger age, long 
before the retirement age or pension claiming age. Additionally, unlike public pension policies in 
other countries, early access to pension wealth in Singapore is related to neither change in health 
insurance coverage nor other work incentives. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the institutional 
background of the CPF in the next section. We present the data, empirical strategy, and findings 
in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively. We conclude in Section 6. 
2. Institutional Background 
The Central Provident Fund 
The CPF is a mandatory, comprehensive social security savings system for citizens and 
permanent residents in Singapore. Conventional pay-as-you-go public pension systems such as 
the U.S. Social Security program pay out defined monthly benefits according to predetermined 
rules. However, the CPF is a set of tax-exempted individual savings accounts to which 
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individuals are required to contribute a significant proportion of their earnings.2 Individuals can 
withdraw from its balances only after the official claiming age (called the payout eligibility age 
or drawdown age in the CPF system), 65 years. Hence, the major feature of the CPF is similar to 
that of the 401(k) plan, a defined contribution pension account in the United States. The core 
function of CPF savings is to cover spending needs for retirement, healthcare, and housing. 
However, CPF savings can also be used to pay education expenses or buy approved insurance 
plans and financial products. 
The monthly contributions from labor earnings go to the following three CPF accounts 
before age 55: Medisave account, Ordinary Account (OA), and Special Account (SA). The 
Medisave account is a medical savings account from which an individual can withdraw balances 
for outpatient care, screenings, hospitalization, and long-term care and approved health insurance 
plans. The OA is a savings account from which people can withdraw some balances only when 
they buy a residential property or a health insurance policy, invest in financial markets, or pay 
for education expenses, regardless of age. The SA balance can be used to invest in government-
approved financial products. The allocation of CPF contributions varies by age and account type 
and follows a schedule predetermined by the government. For example, for those aged 35 and 
below, 62% of CPF contributions go to the OA, while only 21.6% goes to the Medisave account. 
However, for those aged between 60 and 65, 63.6% goes to Medisave, while 21.2% goes to the 
OA. Table A1 shows the allocation schedule. The Singapore CPF Board guarantees an interest 
rate of 2.5% per annum for the OA and 4% per annum for the SA and Medisave account.3 For 
 
2 The contribution rate is 37% of monthly wages (20% by the employee and 17% by the employer) up to age 55. Then, 
it starts to gradually decrease, reaching 12.5% (5% by the employee and 7.5% by the employer) by the 65th birthday. 
3 CPF members can earn an extra 1% interest on the first S$60,000 of combined CPF account balances. 
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further details of the CPF system, see Agarwal et al. (2018) and the official website 
(www.cpf.gov.sg). 
 
CPF Withdrawal Policy upon Reaching Age 55 
Unless CPF account holders disenroll from the CPF system (e.g., immigration or death), it is 
impossible to withdraw CPF balances before one’s 55th birthday except for certain government-
approved purposes such as paying healthcare utilization for family members, purchasing a 
residential property, and paying for children’s education bills. However, upon reaching the 55th 
birthday, CPF account holders can withdraw at least S$5,000 or the remaining CPF balance after 
setting aside the minimum sum set by the government, called the Full Retirement Sum.4 This 
sum is automatically deducted to purchase a life annuity plan called CPF LIFE, and individuals 
can start receiving payouts from age 65. The Full Retirement Sum is S$176,000 for those who 
reach their 55th birthday in 2019.5 If an individual owns a property, he or she can set aside a 
lower amount, called the Basic Retirement Sum, to buy a less generous version (a lower monthly 
payout amount) of CPF LIFE. Those who have insufficient balances to pay for the Basic 
Retirement Sum are ineligible for CPF LIFE or receive prorated payouts depending on available 
balances when reaching 65. The requested withdrawal amount is not subject to income tax. 
However, withdrawal of eligible CPF balances can be made only once a year excluding 
government-approved circumstances. In October 2016, the SLP asked 55–65-year-old 
respondents about their CPF withdrawals at age 55.6 To those between 50 and 54 years, it asked 
 
4 As of April 19, 2019, 1 SGD was equivalent to 0.74 USD or 0.65 EUR. 
5 The Full Retirement Sum has increased each year. For example, it was S$161,000 in 2015 and S$166,000 in 2016. 
The amount will increase by S$5,000 each year for the next two years, too. See Table A2 for the details. 
6 The SLP asked about CPF withdrawals during the year in which respondents turned 55 to two groups separately 
(i.e., 55-year-olds and 56–65-year-olds) to address the potential recall error by older respondents. To those aged 
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their plan to withdraw CPF balances at age 55. Column (1) of Table 1 shows that 41% of those 
aged between 50 and 54 were planning to withdraw CPF balances when they become eligible. 
This expectation is highly consistent with the actual withdrawal behavior of those aged 55 and 
above. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 show that approximately 45% of those aged 55 years and 
40% of those aged between 56 and 65 withdrew some CPF balance when they reached 55, 
respectively. The 50–54-year-old respondents who reported a positive probability of CPF 
withdrawal said they expect to withdraw S$23,743 on average. Of respondents who withdrew 
CPF balances, 55-year-old respondents withdrew S$32,852 on average, while 56–65-year-olds 
withdrew S$42,686. The older group withdrew more because the authorized withdrawal amounts 
were higher. For example, those born before 1954 could have withdrawn up to 50% of their CPF 
balance upon reaching 55. 
3. Data 
Since the introduction of the SLP in July 2015, 7,000–8,000 respondents have participated in the 
survey on a monthly basis, collecting a variety of information on demographics, household 
spending, health, healthcare utilization, subjective well-being, labor market participation, and 
family structure. We use 44 monthly periods of SLP data from July 2015 to March 2019. Our 
key dependent variable is overall health status measured by a self-reported response to the 
following question: “Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” We 
assign 1 to “poor,” 2 to “fair,” 3 to “good,” 4 to “very good,” and 5 to “excellent.” We also 
construct a binary indicator of whether a person’s health status is poor or fair. 
 
above 65 as of October 2016, the SLP did not ask CPF withdrawal-related questions because of recall bias, as the 
event took place more than 10 years ago. CPF withdrawal information was collected in October 2016. 
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To study possible mechanisms, we use healthcare expenditure, domain-specific life 
satisfaction regarding one’s economic situation, the probability of employment and full-time 
status, and spending amounts for selected consumption items as additional dependent variables. 
The SLP collects monthly spending data on medical care such as inpatient and outpatient 
services, prescription drugs, nursing home, and private health insurance. We use total medical 
spending by summing this medical care expenditure. Life satisfaction regarding one’s economic 
situation is measured by the self-reported response to the following question: “How satisfied are 
you with your overall economic situation?” Respondents can choose one of five options, from 
“very dissatisfied” (=1) to “very satisfied” (=5).7 We use binary indicators of employment status 
and full-time work status as measures for labor supply. The consumption spending amounts we 
use are leisure-related activities (e.g., sports, hobbies, vacations); food and beverages; and 
tobacco, which are closely related to health. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
To identify the causal effects of early access to pension wealth on health, we exploit the fact that 
individuals are allowed access to pension wealth upon reaching their 55th birthday. Thus, we 
compare the health status of sample respondents below and above the cutoff age using an RDD. 
For the estimation, we consider the following regression model: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽11[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 > 𝑐]  + 𝑓(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖+𝜀𝑖          (1)   
 
 
7 Overall life satisfaction is measured on the same five-item Likert scale using the self-reported response to the 
following question: “Taking all things together, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” 
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where 𝑦𝑖 is the self-reported overall health status of individual i and 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 is his or her age in 
months. The cutoff age, c, is equal to the month of the 55th birthday, determined by the early 
pension withdrawal policy rule.8  
To identify the effects of early access to pension wealth, we estimate a discontinuity in 
health status at the cutoff age, which is the month of the 55th birthday. 𝑓(𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐) is a smooth 
function between the outcome and age in months. To flexibly control for the age profile of health 
status, we use the second-order polynomials of age in months, fully interacted with 1[𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 > 𝑐], 
based on the age profile of health status from the data. 𝑋𝑖 includes individual characteristics such 
as dummy variables of education attainment, gender, Chinese ethnicity, number of children, 
household net worth, and year fixed effects.  
The parameter of interest is 𝛽1, which represents a discontinuous change in health status 
at the cutoff age. We interpret 𝛽1 as the causal effects of being eligible for early access to 
pension wealth on health. For the statistical inference, we calculate standard errors clustered at 
the age-in-month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 Our key identification assumption is that an individual’s observable and unobservable 
characteristics change smoothly at c except for the withdrawal eligibility of public pension 
savings.9 We indirectly test the validity of this assumption. Figure A1 shows the smooth pattern 
of the observable characteristics at the age cutoff but few discontinuities in the individual 
characteristics. The estimated discontinuities of those characteristics are generally small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. In addition, if our estimate of the discontinuity at the 
 
8 We do not include observations in the month of the 55th birthday, because some respondents surveyed in the month 
of their 55th birthday could be ineligible for the pension balance withdrawal. 
9 Another identification assumption is that individuals cannot manipulate the running variable, that is their age, at 
around the age-55 cutoff. This is a relatively minor requirement in our context because biological age is impossible to 
change by nature. 
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age cutoff is causal, the magnitude of the estimate would be similar regardless of the inclusion of 
the individual characteristics as control variables. Hence, we compare the regression results with 
and without controlling for the individual characteristics as a robustness check.10 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Main Results 
Panels A and B in Figure 1 show the age profiles of health, measured by self-reported general 
health status, and the probability that self-reported general health status is fair or poor, 
respectively. Each dot represents the average health status conditional on age in months. The 
dashed line represents a second-order polynomial fit and the solid line represents the local linear 
regression fit using the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of three months. The shaded area 
represents the 95% confidence intervals of the local linear regression. In both panels, no health 
improvements are observed at the cutoff age. Instead, we observe that self-reported health begins 
to improve immediately before the cutoff age and then continues to improve until it starts to re-
deteriorate after about 12 months. This evidence suggests the presence of anticipated and lagged 
health impacts of early access to pension wealth. Since the early pension withdrawal policy after 
the 55th birthday is publicly known information in advance, there could be an anticipation effect 
on health. On the contrary, since it might take time to accumulate health capital, the health 
impacts of early access to pension wealth could be lagged. 
Table 2 reports the estimated discontinuities in health in the month of the 55th birthday 
using regression specification (1). Column (1) reports that the estimated discontinuities are -
0.006 points for self-reported health status and 0.0001 for the probability that self-reported health 
 
10 The estimates could be statistically more precise when including control variables because the variances of the 
residuals would become smaller. 
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status is fair or poor. These estimates are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. As 
we saw from Figure 1, there could be anticipated and lagged health impacts, which might mask 
the true impacts of early access to pension wealth. To the best of our knowledge, no standard 
approach is available in the RD literature to estimate the potential policy impacts in the presence 
of anticipation and lagged effects. Hence, to account for such anticipation and lagged effects, we 
adopt the donut RD approach that estimates the program effect after dropping observations 
immediately near the cutoff age following Barreca et al. (2011, 2016). We presume that the 
magnitude of the estimates would be greater using larger donut holes if anticipation and lagged 
health impacts exist. Consistent with this conjecture, columns (2) to (7) show that the RD 
estimates become monotonically larger as the size of donut holes increases from one to six 
months. The estimates also become statistically significant when using larger donut holes.11 
Table A3 shows that the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates remain similar, although they 
become statistically less significant when excluding the control variables. 
Then, we report the RD estimates with their 95% confidence intervals by varying the 
length of the bandwidths (see Figure A2). Panels A and B present the donut RD estimates using 
donut hole sizes of zero months and six months, respectively.12 We set the minimum length of 
the bandwidth (ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛) as a function of donut hole size (𝑑), ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛=𝑑+7, to avoid the case in which 
bandwidth length is too short given the donut hole size. Panel A shows that the estimates are 
 
11 Barreca et al. (2016) and Kolesár and Rothe (2018) argue that clustered standard errors could be undesirable due to 
the underlying assumption of employing it for statistical inference. As an alternative approach for the inference, the 
authors suggested to use Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors if the bandwidth size can be 
sufficiently reduced or two recently proposed confidence intervals (bounding the second derivative and bounded 
misspecification error). When we apply the alternative methods for statistical inference, the estimated discontinuities 
become statistically insignificant. Hence, we are cautious about the statistical significance of our main results. The 
results using the alternative methods are available upon request.  
12 We do not report the regression results using other donut hole sizes to save space. The results are available upon 
request. 
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sensitive to the choice of bandwidth when using no donut holes. However, panel B shows that 
the estimates are robust to the choice of bandwidth when using a donut hole of six months. These 
results might suggest that the RD estimates are robust once anticipation and lagged health 
impacts are controlled for. 
 To strengthen the causal interpretation of our findings, we conduct two falsification 
checks. First, we consider 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, and 58 years as pseudo-cutoff ages. If the baseline 
estimates reported in Table 2 are driven by the early pension withdrawal policy, we would not be 
able to find similar impacts on health. Table A4 indeed shows little evidence that the RD 
estimates for self-reported health status and the probability that self-reported general health 
status is fair or poor at the cutoff are statistically insignificant and do not monotonically increase 
when using larger donut holes.13 Second, we investigate whether there are health improvements 
among foreigners. Only citizens and permanent residents are eligible for early access to public 
pension wealth. If the baseline estimates are causal, we would not be able to find similar health 
impacts among foreigners. Table A5 indicates that the estimated discontinuities at the cutoff are 
statistically insignificant and that the estimates do not monotonically increase as the donut hole 
size increases. However, the results should be cautiously interpreted because the sample size of 
these foreigners is only 249.14 
As stated in Section 2, the CPF contribution rate decreases from 37% to 26% upon 
turning 55. Since this reduction might increase labor income, it could improve individuals’ 
health. Although Agarwal et al. (2018) found a limited role of the contribution rate change in 
estimating the effects of CPF withdrawal at age 55 on consumption spending, we conduct 
 
13 The corresponding age profiles are available upon request. 
14 The SLP is designed to survey only citizens and permanent residents. However, foreigners are also surveyed when 
they stay with SLP respondents who are citizens or permanent residents (mostly spouses). We do not report the age 
profiles of foreigners’ health status to save space. The figure is available upon request. 
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another check to rule out its role. We exploit the fact that self-employed and unemployed 
individuals are not affected by the CPF contribution rate reduction. If the estimated health 
improvements in the baseline results are due to the CPF contribution rate reduction, we would 
not observe similar health improvements among the self-employed and unemployed. Table A6 
shows that the estimated health impacts at the cutoff are negative or null. Then, they become 
increasingly positive when using larger donut holes, as in the baseline results. This provides 
additional evidence that our baseline findings might not be driven by the CPF contribution rate 
change. However, the estimates are generally statistically insignificant, which could be due to the 
smaller sample sizes.15 
We examine whether the effects of early access to pension wealth on health are 
heterogeneous by household income. We split individuals into two groups based on their average 
income level over the sample periods. Table A7 shows that the health impacts of individuals 
whose average income level is below the median have similar patterns to those of the baseline 
estimates with larger magnitudes. The estimated discontinuities are small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant when using no or small-sized donut holes. Then, the estimates become 
greater in magnitude and statistically significant when using larger donut holes. By contrast, the 
estimated health impacts among individuals whose average income level is above the median do 
not show such patterns. These results could imply that the baseline results are driven by low-
income individuals.16 
 
5.2. Possible Mechanisms 
 
15 The age profiles of the health status of the unemployed and self-employed are available upon request. 
16 Since we did not find clear evidence of heterogeneous health impacts by household net worth, we argue that the 
results should be cautiously interpreted. 
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We examine possible mechanisms through which early access to pension wealth affects health.17 
We first examine the age profiles of medical spending. However, panel A of Figure 2 shows no 
discontinuity in medical spending at the age cutoff, nor lagged increases in medical spending. As 
stated in Section 2, this is likely to be because of the mandatory medical savings account 
(Medisave) in Singapore from which individuals can withdraw their pension wealth for 
healthcare expenses regardless of age.18 Next, we investigate the age profiles of psychological 
well-being as another possible mechanism. Economic uncertainty under liquidity constraints can 
adversely affect psychological well-being (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006). Early access to 
pension wealth can alleviate these negative psychological impacts even without actually 
withdrawing pension savings and thus may improve health (Graham 2008; Steptoe et al. 2015). 
Panel B shows gradual improvements in psychological well-being measured by life satisfaction 
with respect to one’s economic situation once individuals have access to pension wealth, 
although there is little discontinuity at the age cutoff. In Panel A of Table 3, we estimate a 
discontinuity of medical spending at the age cutoff. Column (1) shows that the estimated 
discontinuity is -S$16.7, but the estimate is statistically insignificant.19 The RD estimates do not 
increase when using larger donut hole sizes. In Panel B, we estimate the discontinuity in life 
satisfaction with respect to one’s economic situation at the age cutoff with and without the donut 
hole approach. Column (1) shows that the estimated discontinuity is 0.004 points, which is 
 
17 We acknowledge that we cannot isolate the relative magnitudes of each mechanism. Our goal is to comprehensively 
investigate the role of possible channels for the positive health impacts of early access to pension wealth. 
18 A withdrawal request is made by authorized medical staff on behalf of patients, and the withdrawn money 
directly transfers from the CPF to healthcare institutions. For the details of the usage categories and their withdrawal 
limits, see https://www.moh.gov.sg/cost-financing/healthcare-schemes-subsidies/medisave. 
19 We also examine sub-categories of aggregate medical expenditure such as inpatient/outpatient care spending, drug 
spending, and spending on traditional Chinese medicine. However, we find no discontinuities at the cutoff. 
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statistically insignificant. However, the discontinuities become greater in magnitude and 
statistically significant when using larger donut holes.20 
Then, we examine the effects of early access to pension wealth on labor supply and 
consumption spending. Panel C of Figure 2 shows the age profiles of the employment probability 
where it appears to discontinuously decrease at the cutoff. Panel D shows that the probability of 
full-time work does not seem to discontinuously increase at the cutoff.21 Panel C of Table 3 
indicates that the discontinuity is -0.8 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level. 
However, the estimates become statistically insignificant when using the donut RD approach. 
Panel D shows that the estimated discontinuities are small in magnitude, although they are 
statistically significant in general. The spontaneous reduction in employment could have lagged 
health impacts. However, the results are not consistent with those on the probability of full-time 
work, which deters us from arguing changes in labor supply as a mechanism for the health 
improvements. 
We also present the age profiles of consumption spending related to health.22 Panels E to 
G in Figure 2 show little evidence of discontinuous changes in leisure, food and beverages, and 
tobacco spending at the age cutoff, nor lagged increases in spending. Consistent with the 
findings, panels E to G of Table 3 show that the estimated discontinuities at the cutoff are small 
in magnitude and mostly statistically insignificant, and the estimates do not increase when using 
larger donut holes. 
 
 
20 Table A8 shows that the estimated discontinuities in overall life satisfaction have similar patterns but are less 
statistically significant. The corresponding age profiles are available upon request. 
21 The SLP does not provide information on specific working hours. 
22 Agarwal et al. (2018) found an increase in cumulative credit and debit card spending by $650 over the 12-month 
period after an individual turns 55 (i.e., about $54 per month). Aggregate spending shows a similar pattern, but we do 
not report it here because it is already documented by Agarwal et al. (2018). 
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6. Conclusion and Discussion 
To prepare for spending needs after retirement, individuals are often mandated by the government 
to save a large proportion of their labor income in the form of a public pension scheme. Since 
mandated savings could create liquidity constraints and thereby a welfare loss, it is important to 
understand whether enabling individuals to access their pension wealth early can actually improve 
their welfare. 
In this study, we focus on the effects of early access to pension wealth on health by 
exploiting a unique policy rule in Singapore that allows individuals to withdraw a proportion of 
their pension savings after their 55th birthday. Using the donut RD approach to account for 
anticipation and lagged effects, we find that early access to pension wealth improves self-reported 
overall health significantly. Since 41% of the 55-year-olds in our dataset withdraw S$23,743 on 
average from their pension savings accounts upon turning 55, our back-of-the-envelope calculation 
indicates that reallocating S$10,000 before retirement can improve self-reported health by about 
0.09 points.23 
Several studies have examined the health impacts of changes (mostly increases) in income 
(Lindahl 2005; Gross and Tobacman 2014; Van Kippersluis and Galama 2014; Apouey and Clark 
2015; Cesarini et al. 2016). They tend to find few health impacts of positive income shocks except 
for Lindahl (2005). As a potential explanation, Van Kippersluis and Galama (2014) and Gross and 
Tobacman (2014) showed that individuals who experience positive income shocks are more likely 
to engage in unhealthy behaviors such as alcohol drinking or smoking. By contrast, we find that 
changing the allocations of pension wealth can improve health. One possible explanation for this 
 
23 We cannot estimate the local average treatment effect of the early pension withdrawal at the cutoff age because of 
the lack of withdrawal data needed for the first-stage estimation. 
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difference is that individuals might have weaker incentives to behave unhealthily when they are 
allowed to reallocate their own wealth. Since allowing the early withdrawal of pension balances 
does not necessarily increase the fiscal burden of the government, our results imply that flexible 
access to pension wealth could be a cost-effective policy to improve the health of middle-aged 
individuals, at least in the short run.  
One policy concern about early access to pension wealth is that individuals may squander 
their savings, leaving insufficient wealth after retirement and thus a worse health status. However, 
our research design and the available data do not allow us to test this hypothesis.24 We leave this 
issue to future research. 
  
 
24 Although the official CPF LIFE annuity payout eligible age is 65 years old, we find no evidence of a discontinuous 
change in the employment rate at this age cutoff. Given this lack of discontinuous employment change, we cannot 
examine the health impacts of retirement further. As a supplementary analysis, we examine the dynamic effects on 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Age Profiles of Health Status 
 
A. Self-reported health status B. Pr(self-reported health status≤fair) 
  
Notes: The horizontal axis represents distance from the month of the 55th birthday. The vertical axis is self-reported health status scores and the 
probability that self-reported health status is lower than fair in panels A and B, respectively. Dots indicate average of health status in each age in 
month. Black line is a local linear regression fit separately computed on either side of zero using the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 3 
months. Shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals of the local linear regressions. Dashed line is a second order polynomial fit separately 
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Figure 2. Age Profiles of Medical Expenditure, Life satisfaction, Labor Supply,  
and Other Consumption Spending 
A. Medical expenditure B. Life satisfaction on economic situation 
  
C. Pr(Employed) D. Pr(Full-time work) 
  
E. Leisure spending F. Food spending 
  
G. Tobacco spending  
 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents distance from the month of the 55th birthday. Dots indicate the averages of outcome variables in each age in 
month. Black line is a local linear regression fit separately on either side of zero using the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 3 months. 
Shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals of the local linear regressions. Dashed line is a second order polynomial fit separately computed 
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Table 2. RD Estimates of Effects of Early Access to Pension Wealth on Self-reported Health  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Dependent variable: Self-reported health status  
1[Age > 55] -0.006 0.003 0.020* 0.027* 0.036** 0.044* 0.083*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.026) (0.024) 
        
Observations 78,138 74,636 71,129 67,638 64,126 60,664 57,238 
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 
        
B. Dependent variable: Pr(Self-reported health status≤Fair)  
1[Age > 55] 0.0001 -0.002 -0.016* -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.036** -0.050*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
        
Observations 78,138 74,636 71,129 67,638 64,126 60,664 57,238 
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. We include a second order of polynomials of age in month and its full interactions 
with 1[Age > 55]. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education 




Table 3. RD Estimates of Effects of Early Access to Pension Wealth on  
Medical Expenditure, Life Satisfaction, Labor Supply, and Other Consumption Spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Dependent variable: Medical expenditure 
1[Age > 55] -16.72 -27.22 -31.26 -59.21* -32.19 -73.40* -58.16 
 (13.14) (17.15) (25.42) (30.31) (38.40) (41.12) (54.84) 
        
Observations 74,286 70,974 67,635 64,313 60,968 57,673 54,425 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.041 
        
B. Dependent variable: Life satisfaction on economic situation 
1[Age > 55] 0.004 0.017 0.038** 0.050** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.077** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.034) 
        
Observations 78,092 74,593 71,088 67,599 64,089 60,627 57,202 
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 
        
C. Dependent variable: Pr(Employed) 
1[Age > 55] -0.008** -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) 
        
Observations 78,018 74,520 71,018 67,535 64,026 60,568 57,148 
R-squared 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.068 
        
D. Dependent variable: Pr(Full-time work) 
1[Age > 55] 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.016** 0.018** 0.019* 0.022* 0.022 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
        
Observations 70,776 67,589 64,413 61,252 58,065 54,933 51,820 
R-squared 0.073 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075 
        
E. Dependent variable: Leisure spending 
1[Age > 55] 13.912 10.753 -14.840 3.212 11.149 -11.958 8.809 
 (22.948) (32.026) (25.847) (35.892) (51.138) (62.467) (63.322) 
        
Observations 78,604 75,072 71,541 68,026 64,489 61,003 57,553 
R-squared 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.062 0.061 
        
F. Dependent variable: Food spending 
1[Age > 55] 12.319** 15.385** 15.798 12.260 28.820* 18.618 14.410 
 (5.132) (7.061) (9.610) (13.633) (14.830) (18.694) (24.575) 
        
Observations 78,604 75,072 71,541 68,026 64,489 61,003 57,553 
R-squared 0.161 0.162 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.164 0.165 
        
G. Dependent variable: Tobacco spending 
1[Age > 55] -0.185 0.149 0.748 0.736 0.129 -1.015 -1.422 
 (0.567) (0.718) (0.771) (1.043) (1.383) (1.870) (2.795) 
        
Observations 74,791 71,444 68,080 64,731 61,368 58,041 54,773 
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education attainments, gender, Chinese ethnicity, number of children, year dummies, and household net 
worth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix Figures and Tables 
 
Figure A1. Age Profiles of Individual Characteristics 
 
A. Pr(Primary education) B. Pr(Male) C. Pr(Chinese) 
   
Discontinuity (SE): 0.001 (0.003) Discontinuity (SE): -0.006 (0.004) Discontinuity (SE): -0.0001 (0.003) 
   
D. Number of children E. Pr(Married) G. Household net worth 
   
Discontinuity (SE): 0.024 (0.007) Discontinuity (SE): 0.006 (0.004) Discontinuity (SE): -11945 (15920) 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents distance from the month of the 55th birthday. The vertical axis is individuals’ demographics. Dots indicate 
average of health status in each age in month. Black line is a local linear regression fit separately on either side of zero using the Epanechnikov 
kernel and a bandwidth of 3 months. Shaded area indicates 95% confidence intervals of the local linear regressions. Dashed line is a second order 






Figure A2. RD Estimates using Alternative Bandwidth 
 
A. Donut hole: 0 month 
Self-reported health status Pr(self-reported health status≤fair) 
  
  
B. Donut hole: 6 months 
Self-reported health status Pr(self-reported health status≤fair) 
  
Notes: The horizontal axis represents the size of bandwidths. The vertical axis represents the magnitude of coefficient estimates. The horizontal red 
line denotes the coefficient estimate of the baseline estimate in which the bandwidth is 24 months. The black line represents the RD estimate for 





Table A1. Allocation of CPF Contributions by Account and Age 
 
Employee's age  
(years) 
Allocation Rates from 1 Jan 2016 
(for monthly wages ≥ $750) 
Ordinary Account 
(% of wage) 
Special Account 
(% of wage) 
Medisave Account 
(% of wage) 
Total 
35 and below 23 6 8 37 
Above 35 to 45 21 7 9 37 
Above 45 to 50 19 8 10 37 
Above 50 to 55 15 11.5 10.5 37 
Above 55 to 60 12 3.5 10.5 26 
Above 60 to 65 3.5 2.5 10.5 16.5 
Above 65 1 1 10.5 12.5 






Table A2. Maximum CPF balances allowed to withdraw upon reaching 55th birthday 
 
Individuals can choose to withdraw the remaining CPF balances (excluding top-up monies, government grants, and 
interest earned in your Retirement Account) after setting aside the Full Retirement Sum or the Basic Retirement Sum 
with sufficient CPF property charge/pledge. Or, they can withdraw up to $5,000 of Ordinary and Special Account 
savings if they are unable to set aside the Full Retirement Sum (FRS) or the Basic Retirement Sum (BRS) with 
sufficient CPF property charge/pledge. The FRS is the required balance to receive a life annuity (called CPF Life) 
after the claiming age in Singapore. The BRS is the less generous version of the CPF Life annuity with a lower required 
amount. The Full Retirement Sum or the Basic Retirement Sum has been gradually increasing over the years as 
follows: 
 
55th birthday on or after Full Retirement Sum 
1 July 2015 $161,000 
1 January 2017 $166,000 
1 January 2018 $171,000 
1 January 2019 $176,000 
1 January 2020 $181,000 
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Table A3. RD Estimates of Effects of Early Access to Pension Wealth on Self-reported Health  
Excluding Control Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Dependent variable: Self-reported health status  
1[Age > 55] -0.011 -0.007 0.015* 0.018 0.026 0.038 0.081*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) (0.026) (0.019) 
        
Observations 82,203 78,509 74,824 71,144 67,426 63,795 60,196 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
        
B. Dependent variable: Pr(Self-reported health status≤Fair)  
1[Age > 55] 0.002 0.003 -0.013 -0.018** -0.021** -0.030** -0.044*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
        
Observations 82,203 78,509 74,824 71,144 67,426 63,795 60,196 
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. We include a second order of polynomials of age in month and its full interactions 
with 1[Age > 55]. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education 




Table A4. RD Estimates of Effects of Fake Early Access to Pension Wealth  
 
Dependent variable: self-reported health status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Cutoff age (c): 52 years 
1[Age > c] 0.014 0.032 0.025 0.003 -0.000 0.077 0.092 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.042) (0.056) (0.060) (0.096) 
        
Observations 39,340 37,745 36,148 34,540 32,931 31,333 29,756 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 
        
B. Cutoff age (c): 53 years 
1[Age > c] -0.003 0.013 0.023 -0.003 -0.001 0.048 0.079* 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.034) (0.035) (0.045) 
        
Observations 55,713 53,264 50,817 48,382 45,931 43,497 41,087 
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 
        
C. Cutoff age (c): 54 years 
1[Age > c] -0.016 -0.035*** -0.032** -0.044*** -0.049** -0.026 -0.044 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) 
        
Observations 69,687 66,621 63,534 60,443 57,370 54,296 51,211 
R-squared 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 
        
D. Cutoff age (c): 56 years 
1[Age > c] 0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.006 -0.008 -0.038* -0.039 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) 
        
Observations 82,435 78,971 75,534 72,079 68,644 65,179 61,711 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022 
        
E. Cutoff age (c): 57 years 
1[Age > c] 0.013 0.018* 0.020 0.019 0.053*** 0.062** 0.047** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) 
        
Observations 82,635 79,131 75,689 72,233 68,766 65,277 61,793 
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 
        
F. Cutoff age (c): 58 years 
1[Age > c] -0.024*** -0.023** -0.029** -0.036** -0.038* -0.009 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) 
        
Observations 81,015 77,532 74,066 70,619 67,156 63,744 60,320 
R-squared 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 
Donut hole  
Size 




Dependent variable: Pr(self-reported health status ≤ fair) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Cutoff age (c): 52 years 
1[Age > c] -0.005 -0.010 -0.006 0.008 -0.005 -0.047 -0.089* 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) (0.037) (0.045) 
        
Observations 39,340 37,745 36,148 34,540 32,931 31,333 29,756 
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
        
B. Cutoff age (c): 53 years 
1[Age > c] 0.015 0.005 -0.008 0.004 0.008 -0.016 -0.068*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.029) (0.021) 
        
Observations 55,713 53,264 50,817 48,382 45,931 43,497 41,087 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 
        
C. Cutoff age (c): 54 years 
1[Age > c] 0.010* 0.017*** 0.020** 0.026** 0.017 0.002 0.018 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
        
Observations 69,687 66,621 63,534 60,443 57,370 54,296 51,211 
R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 
        
D. Cutoff age (c): 56 years 
1[Age > c] -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.014 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
        
Observations 82,435 78,971 75,534 72,079 68,644 65,179 61,711 
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 
        
E. Cutoff age (c): 57 years 
1[Age > c] -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.028*** -0.032** -0.026** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) 
        
Observations 82,635 79,131 75,689 72,233 68,766 65,277 61,793 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 
        
F. Cutoff age (c): 58 years 
1[Age > c] 0.009* 0.011* 0.016** 0.021** 0.023* 0.016 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.026) 
        
Observations 81,015 77,532 74,066 70,619 67,156 63,744 60,320 
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. We include a second order of polynomials of age in month and its full interactions 
with 1[Age > 55]. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education 
attainments, gender, Chinese ethnicity, number of children, year dummies, and household net worth.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
31 
Table A5. RD Estimates of Effects of Early Access to Pension Wealth on Self-reported Health  
Using the Foreigner Sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Dependent variable: Self-reported health status  
1[Age > 55] 0.066 -0.199 -0.365 -0.481* -0.744** -0.584 -0.522 
 (0.189) (0.174) (0.234) (0.281) (0.321) (0.426) (0.672) 
        
Observations 249 237 227 217 206 196 186 
R-squared 0.215 0.222 0.219 0.213 0.216 0.209 0.210 
        
B. Dependent variable: Pr(Self-reported health status≤Fair)  
1[Age > 55] 0.065 0.195 0.095 0.050 0.254 0.035 -0.054 
 (0.108) (0.126) (0.159) (0.193) (0.233) (0.334) (0.472) 
        
Observations 249 237 227 217 206 196 186 
R-squared 0.153 0.156 0.154 0.154 0.159 0.157 0.171 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. We include a second order of polynomials of age in month and its full interactions 
with 1[Age > 55]. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education 





Table A6. RD Estimates of Effects of Early Access to Pension Wealth on Self-reported Health  
Using the Sample of Self-employed or Unemployed Individuals 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Dependent variable: Self-reported health status  
1[Age > 55] -0.035** -0.025 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.013 0.032 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027) (0.040) (0.045) 
        
Observations 26,799 25,628 24,437 23,258 22,066 20,907 19,757 
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 
        
B. Dependent variable: Pr(Self-reported health status≤Fair)  
1[Age > 55] 0.016 0.011 -0.011 -0.023 -0.038* -0.043 -0.052 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.037) 
        
Observations 26,799 25,628 24,437 23,258 22,066 20,907 19,757 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. We include a second order of polynomials of age in month and its full interactions 
with 1[Age > 55]. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education 




Table A7. RD Estimates of Effects of Early Access to Pension Wealth on Self-reported Health  
by Income 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Using individuals whose average income is below median  
1[Age > 55] 0.008 0.031 0.058*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.087** 0.128*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.037) (0.040) 
        
Observations 35,540 33,981 32,411 30,846 29,271 27,736 26,207 
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 
        
B. Using individuals whose average income is above median  
1[Age > 55] -0.017* -0.022** -0.014 -0.021 -0.012 0.003 0.042 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.031) (0.036) 
        
Observations 42,245 40,317 38,398 36,486 34,564 32,654 30,772 
R-squared 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. We include a second order of polynomials of age in month and its full interactions 
with 1[Age > 55]. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education 







Table A8. RD Estimates of Effects of Early Access to Pension Wealth on 
Overall Life Satisfaction 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
1[Age > 55] 0.006 0.017 0.030** 0.041** 0.039 0.036 0.062 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.024) (0.035) (0.046) 
        
Observations 78,189 74,680 71,167 67,675 64,161 60,701 57,271 
R-squared 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.041 
Donut hole  
Size 
0 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 
Notes: We restrict the sample to citizens and permanent residents. We include a second order of polynomials of age in month and its full interactions 
with 1[Age > 55]. Standard errors are clustered at age in month level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. Other controls include education 
attainments, gender, Chinese ethnicity, number of children, year dummies, and household net worth.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
